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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the ongoing problem of
replacing expiring pharmaceutical and medical/surgical items stocked in Marine
Corps Authorized Medical/Dental Allowance Lists (AMALs/ADALs).
AMALs/ADALs allocated to the Fleet Marine Force are classified as Prepositioned
War Reserve (PWR), required to be immediately available for combat support.
Due to the short shelf-life of these items, maintaining this PWR creates excessive
financial losses, costing the Marine Corps approximately eight million dollars per
year. In February 1993, the Department of Defense implemented the Prime
Vendor Program to eliminate excessive hospital inventories. This form of Just-in-
Time inventory management improves the quality of health care by eliminating
long procurement leadtimes and losses due to expirations and overstocking of
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supplies. This thesis analyzes the financial
and logistical benefits that can be achieved by extending the Prime Vendor
Program to include maintaining AMALs/ADALs. Our analysis shows that, by
adopting the Prime Vendor Program, the Marine Corps could realize a potential
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With declining Department of Defense (DoD) budgets and government
contractual reform, the military must take action to reduce unnecessary
expenditures and increase efficiency, while maintaining the equipment, personnel
and supplies necessary to meet potential threats anywhere in the world. Amongst
the myriad of Prepositioned War Reserve (PWR) materiel are the perishable
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supplies considered essential for the treatment
and care of those injured in military action. These dated and deteriorative supplies
are acquired, held, and maintained only to meet war reserve materiel requirements
in accordance with instructions contained in various instructions, orders and
directives. These items, referred to as Authorized Medical Allowance Lists
(AMALs) in the Naval Service, represent the minimum that must be available to
support combat operations for a specified time period. However, since they are
maintained for use only as a contingency, many items in the AMALs are disposed
of each year, at significant financial loss, because they have reached their
maximum shelf life.
The Medical Logistics Company is the organization tasked with maintaining
AMALs for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Currently, the Marine Corps
is organized into three standing MEFs: I MEF on the West Coast, II MEF on the
East Coast, and HI MEF in Okinawa. A MEF is normally deployed with 60 days
of supply (DOS) for all necessary logistics support, including medical supplies.
Current policy is to maintain the entire 60-day supply of AMALs for immediate
deployment. In I MEF alone, this requirement costs the Marine Corps over two
million dollars annually.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
Emphasizing its status as the nation's "Force-in-Readiness," the Marine
Corps has built a reputation for being "first to fight. " "With its emphasis on rapid
response to regional crises, the national military strategy places a premium on the
expeditionary capabilities of the Marine Corps..." (CJCS, Feb 1993) They have
gained this reputation by adopting a philosophy of maintaining the necessary
prepositioned war reserves to independently deploy each MEF.
This philosophy, applied at the Medical Logistics Company level, requires
maintaining each MEF's 60-day supply of pharmaceutical and medical/surgical
supplies. The trouble with maintaining these consumable AMALs, given their
dated and deteriorative nature, is their limited shelf-life. This shelf-life limitation
creates a need for each Medical Logistics Company to dispose of expired supplies
and replenish with new stock. Roughly one-third of the inventory is replaced each
year. (Aguigam, 1991) In a time when "defense spending as a share of our total
national resources is near its lowest point in 40 years" (USMC, 1994), this type
of inventory system can easily be targeted as a waste of precious financial
resources.
A December 1991 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report criticized
the Department of Defense's medical inventory and contracting practices. The
GAO recommended applying commercial inventory management practices to
military medical facilities. In response to this report, the services instituted a
"Prime Vendor Program" to provide pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supplies
to their Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). Dividing the nation into 22
geographic regions, separate contracts are awarded for pharmaceutical supplies and
medical/surgical supplies. Within each region, each MTF receives all of its
respective supplies from one vendor. As a result of the Prime Vendor Program,
MTFs have reduced stock levels, manpower expense, and loss due to expired shelf
life item disposal. Additionally, the electronic ordering system used by the Prime
Vendors has resulted in faster order processing. "The Prime Vendor Program has
been identified as having favorable impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of
the Medical Logistics community." (DISA, 1994)
The objective of this research is to investigate the potential of adopting the
Prime Vendor Program to support Marine Corps AMALs/ADALs without
reducing readiness. As such, the first step is to identify whether the Prime Vendor
Program can provide significant financial savings for the Marine Corps' PWR
program. Maintaining the dated and deteriorative AMAL/ADAL pharmaceutical
and medical/surgical supplies is an expensive endeavor. However, since the total
amount of PWR is distributed throughout three MEFs and two prepositioning
programs, the total cost of this program is inconspicuous. Before the Marine
Corps can trust the lives of its personnel to a new business practice, the
responsiveness of this new program, and the pharmaceutical and medical/surgical
supply industry itself must be analyzed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS




Can the Prime Vendor Program provide financial savings for maintaining
Marine Corps Authorized Medical/Dental Allowance Lists.
2. What is the current total cost to the Marine Corps to maintain dated and
deteriorative pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supplies in PWR?
3. Is the Prime Vendor Program responsive enough to deliver necessary
supplies during the contingency build-up and subsequent resupply period without
reducing readiness?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis focuses on the current Prime Vendor Program as used in
Military Treatment Facilities and analyzes its potential for use by Marine Corps
Medical Logistics Companies. Although the research focused on the 1st Medical
Logistics Company in Camp Pendleton, California, similar financial loss is being
experienced by the two other Medical Logistics Companies as well as the Marine
Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force and Norway Airlanded MEB program. By
comparing the total costs required to maintain current purchasing and inventory
practices with that of the Prime Vendor Program, we hope to show that by
incorporating the Prime Vendor Program, the Marine Corps will significantly
reduce the cost of maintaining PWR pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supplies.
The Prime Vendor Program was initiated in January 1993 with the first
contract awarded strictly for pharmaceutical supplies. The first contracts dealing
with medical/surgical supplies have only recently been awarded and, as such, the
necessary information needed to evaluate anticipated savings in this area are
unavailable. It is assumed that equivalent savings will result through the new
Prime Vendor Program medical/surgical contracts as has been experienced through
the pharmaceuticals contracts.
E. CURRENT MEDICAL LOGISTIC PRACTICES
A Medical Logistics (MedLog) Company, under the direction and guidance
of the Commanding Officer of Supply Battalion, Force Service Support Group, is
tasked with providing for the receipt, storage and issue of Class VIQ
(medical/dental) supplies and equipment in support of the Authorized
Medical/Dental Allowance List (AMAL/ADAL) of medical/dental units and
elements. AMAL/ADALs are warehoused in modular form to facilitate rapid
mountout and resupply response. Each module contain equipment or consumables
necessary to perform a specific health care function under combat/deployed
conditions. Consumable materials contained in the AMAL/ADALs comprise the
necessary materiel to support a predetermined patient care load associated with a
specific health care function. This patient care load is based on the worst case
scenario of one MEF incurring 8,381 battle casualties from D-day to D+60. Due
to limited warehouse space and the manpower-intensive nature of AMAL/ADAL
management, a minimum of 25 percent of the consumable supplies are kept in
modular form. The remainder of the MEF's 60-day supply is maintained by the
MedLog company in bulk storage for subsequent deployment to the theater of
operations. The 60 DOS requirement is based on the estimated time needed to
support the MEF until normal replenishment methods can be established in the
theater of operations. Unlike other forms of supply, where the 60 DOS starts
when the unit deploys from its base, the 60 DOS inherent in AMALs/ADALs start
when actual combat operations begin.
MedLog companies currently obtain their supplies through the Supported
Activities Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit (SMU). (Note: The SMU
provides centralized supply control and management for the entire MEF,
accounting for virtually all classes of supply). MedLog companies manage these
supplies until they're issued to units for training or contingency operations. Since
pharmaceutical items with less than 12 months of remaining shelf life are
considered non-deployable, when these supplies near the end of their shelf-life
MedLog companies attempt redistribution to other users. Expired drugs are
disposed of through Pine Bluff Arsenal or the Defense Reutilization and Marketing
Office (DRMO). Most of the pharmaceuticals stocked by MedLog companies are
ordered by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) through the Defense Personnel
Support Center (DPSC). Annual reviews are conducted to ensure materials with
less than 12 months of shelf-life remaining are pulled from the AMAL blocks for
disposition or disposal.
Tracking these items is a labor intensive process and two million
dollars worth of pharmaceuticals await disposition every year. If
MedLog can not issue or redistribute the stock to other Military
Treatment Facilities (MTFs) or Navy and Marine Corps units, there
is financial loss. (Aguigam, 1991)
The tracking system becomes even more complicated once the pharmaceuticals are
placed into the AMAL blocks, requiring inventory personnel to open each block
and inspect each item. To combat this time-intensive process, 1st MedLog
Company recently began stocking dated material separate from their modular
AMAL/ADAL blocks for easier access. The material is now maintained with like
material in a central location, to be returned to their respective AMAL/ADALs
when required for issue. By making this material more accessible, personnel
spend less time conducting periodic inventory maintenance and review, without
reducing readiness.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This chapter provided a background of problems related to pharmaceutical
and medical/surgical supplies in the Marine Corps' PWR program, including a
review of the immense responsibility of one of the organizations charged with
maintaining these supplies. The following chapter focuses on the Prime Vendor
Program, DoD's successful solution to reducing pharmaceutical costs. Chapter HI
analyzes global challenges affecting the demand for medical PWR and domestic
issues forcing changes to current requirements. Chapter IV discusses proposed
alternatives that are currently available to the Marine Corps, comparing trade-offs
and cost-benefits of the current system versus the increased customer response of
Prime Vendor Program. Chapter V offers conclusions and recommendations, as
well as suggesting recommendations for further study.

II. PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM OVERVIEW
This chapter examines the DoD's Prime Vendor Program and the cost
savings impact it has accomplished at Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). The
Prime Vendor Program has successfully reduced the MTF's delivered costs of
medical supplies while improving their customer support.
A. MEDICAL LOGISTICS BEFORE THE PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM
Prior to Prime Vendor Program initiation, the DoD medical logistics system
consisted of wholesale and retail operations. The Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) managed the wholesale function through the Medical Directorate of the
Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) and the DLA Depot system. DPSC
purchased large quantities of medical consumables, stored them in depots and
issued them as needed to medical units and facilities. DLA "provides
approximately 50 percent of the supplies used by medical facilities in the
continental United States and most of the supplies used by overseas facilities."
(GAO, 1991) Contracting for these supplies provided DLA with quantity
discounts which, after attaching a surcharge to cover overhead, were passed on to
their customers. Prices for these items where published on Federal Supply
Schedules (FSS). DLA negotiated the prices with manufacturers and distributors
through competitive bidding, thus insuring the best possible price for the
government. DLA's surcharge added 20 percent to the cost of the total purchase
order.
The military treatment facility (MTF) ordered supplies from the depots,
using priorities established under the Uniform Material Movement and Issue
Priority System (UMMIPS). Highest priority items, those needed within seven
days, were ordered using "Priority 3" ("2 M for a deployed medical activity, and
"1" for a combat zone facility). For those items that were needed in 15 days or
less, "Priority 6" was used ("5" for deployed, "4" for combat zone). The lowest
urgency was "Priority 13," which gave the system 31 days to get the item to the
ordering facility. (MCO 4400. 16G) One of the fundamental problems with this
system, the major reason for MTFs holding excessive inventory, was that
turnaround times for anything less than Priority 3 were twice these established
rates. MTFs typically maintained "unofficial" inventories because they lacked
confidence in supplies being available when needed. Thus a greater amount of
"safety stock" was stored than demand warranted. Additionally it was difficult to
accurately calculate on-hand balances, usage rates, and reorder points due to
inaccurate information, often resulting in inventory levels equivalent to a six
months' supply or more.
For the MTF's additional pharmaceutical needs, retail procedures similar
to those used by civilian hospitals were available. That is, if an item was not
available from DPSC, or the turnaround time was unacceptable, the MTF
established individual purchase procedures with manufacturers and wholesalers,
or purchased material from local commercial sources. (Clayton, 1993) Purchasing
from local vendors, referred to as an "open purchase," was a complicated process
requiring excessive paperwork and official approval to insure a fair price and
proper business practices were followed. Figure 2-1 illustrates the system DoD








Figure 2-1. DoD Medical Logistics System prior
to the Prime Vendor Program
DLA's medical materiel inventories also serve as prepositioned war reserve
stocks. These stocks are funded by the individual services but are owned and
stored by the DLA. The Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), a
subcommand of DLA, manages these stocks. The PWR stocks are those required
to be on hand to support initial contingency requirements until a "surge" in
industrial production can meet wartime consumption demands.
...surge is the first acceleration of production from peacetime rates
to something 50 to 200 percent higher and is required for small wars
or ambiguous situations ... and ... surge entails having industry
increase production in response to higher orders, and make efforts
to reduce lead times but without having to disrupt its commercial
work. (Libicki, 1988)
Under surge conditions, the responsiveness of the pharmaceutical industry is
estimated to be three to six months. As such, to meet the worst case scenario,
DLA/DPSC maintains enough medical consumables to support the first 180 days
of combat (Cuddy, et al. 1988). In the case of the Marine Corps, as the 60 days
of PWR are expended, the remaining 120 days of stock would be requisitioned
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from DLA/DPSC stocks. "Based on this method of support, capability was
measured in terms of inventory levels." (DoD, 1994)
B. MEDICAL LOGISTICS UNDER THE PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM
In January 1993, the DoD awarded a five year, $100 million contract to the
McKesson Corporation to supply prescription drugs to Defense Department
hospitals. This contract, "the first contract under a new system under which the
department will select prime pharmaceutical vendors to regionally supply military
hospitals," covered 11 hospitals near the Washington D.C. area. (Wall Street
Journal, 1993) This new system, called the Prime Vendor Program, was the first
large-scale effort to drive down the costs of distributing medical supplies.
The Prime Vendor Program is the medical community's contribution toward
improving DoD buying practices. The 1980s were full of headlines reporting
excess inventories far exceeding requirements of peacetime or wartime operations.
In 1985, President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,
known as the Packard Commission (from its chairman Senator David Packard),
studied defense management policies. The Packard commission recommended,
among many other important changes, better use of the country's "technological
and industrial capabilities and resources." (Packard, 1986) President Bush
requested a review of DoD management practices resulting in several Defense
Management Review Decisions (DMRD) aimed to achieve cost savings through
reducing overhead, eliminating redundant functions, and implementing modern
business practices. In November 1989,
...the secretary of defense sent to the president the defense
management report filled with management improvement initiatives
to streamline DoD business practices to save over 70 billion dollars
by 1997. The first of these initiatives sought to resize the
department's supply inventory to support a smaller more flexible
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force while maintaining readiness. In May 1990, the DoD
introduced a comprehensive, integrated plan that addressed every
aspect of how the department managed its inventory. (Morales,
1992)
Reviewing each inventory category and the purpose for holding those inventories,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the services and the DLA rewrote
all material management policy and methodology. DLA's efforts to standardize
business practices and improve inventory practices netted over two billion dollars
in savings over a two year period. One of these changes involved increased direct
vendor delivery to DoD customers.
In December 1991, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) published a
report criticizing DoD's medical inventory practices. They leveled their criticism
at the use of a depot (i.e., DLA/DPSC) system to maintain inventories and support
requirements. In effect, the depot inventories were too large and, in some cases,
non-shelf life stock was held indefinitely for lack of disposal instructions. The
GAO recommended implementation of practices similar to those used in the
civilian sector. Specifically, the use of "Prime Vendors to deliver supplies from
a variety of manufacturers directly to medical facilities." (GAO, 1991)
Commercial practices involving Prime Vendors used just-in-time delivery
procedures to provide hospitals with needed supplies on demand. This allowed
facilities to purchase medical supplies, at a discount, without actually storing and
maintaining them in bulk quantities at their own warehouses. The GAO
determined the DoD could achieve significant cost savings while maintaining high
quality health care. "The trick was to adapt this commercial practice to the myriad
Government purchasing and fiscal control regulations, then establish a means of
transmitting transactions electronically to both the DoD-wide logistics system and
the material management systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force hospitals."
13
(Bird, 1993) In March 1992, DPSC established a task force to implement changes
in their current business practices, choosing to adopt the commercial concept of
the Prime Vendor to acquire and distribute medical supplies for the DoD.
The Prime Vendor is "a single distributor of commercial 'brand-specific'
medical supplies for a group of hospitals in a given geographic area. " (Tackitt,
1992) The Prime Vendor Program divided the country into 22 geographic regions,
with each region having two Prime Vendors, one for pharmaceuticals and one for
consumable medical/surgical supplies. These Prime Vendors are then the principal
source of supply for their respective consumable medical items for each DoD MTF
within that region, providing 24-hour delivery and an on-line interactive catalog
and order-entry system. As specified in the contract, a Prime Vendor can be
responsible for delivering, stocking, and, if necessary, a full credit return of all
items purchased through that vendor.
Since the first contract was awarded in the National Capitol region in
January 1993, all of the pharmaceutical contracts and most of the medical/surgical
supply contracts have been award. It is estimated that the last medical/surgical
supply contract will be awarded in February 1995. Eventually, if long range plans
are successfully implemented, the Prime Vendor Program will support Europe,
Okinawa and the Pacific Rim, as well as ships at sea and deployed Fleet Hospitals
and Army DepMeds Hospitals. The Defense Personnel Support Center monitors
the Prime Vendor Program for the Department of Defense. Figure 2-2 illustrates






Figure 2-2. DoD Medical Logistics System Using
the Prime Vendor Program
The main goal of the Prime Vendor Program is to reduce the MTF's overall
delivered cost for brand name medical supplies. This is accomplished by reducing
stock levels, reducing losses caused by expirations and overstocking, reducing
manpower and using existing industry automation to expedite order processing.
The Prime Vendor Program attempts to remove the practice of "just in case"
inventories and replace it with "just-in-time" inventory methods, providing "the
minimum inventory necessary to keep a perfect system running" (Heizer &
Render, 1993) and eliminating "uncertainties wherever possible throughout the
supply channel." (Ballou, 1992) Effectively, through a close relationship with one
Prime Vendor, demand is analyzed, a pattern is established, and the Prime Vendor
determines inventory levels to meet the needs of the major functional units, (e.g.,
pharmacy, laboratory, surgery) within the MTFs, thereby reducing response time
and leadtime variability. The Prime Vendor Program, by "meeting the goal of
having the right goods at the right place at the right time" (Ballou, 1992) has thus
eliminated both the waste of overlapping functions and the MTF's extra inventories
resulting in a more responsive, less expensive medical logistics system.
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C. PRIME VENDOR SELECTION
Before DPSC could award Prime Vendor contracts, it first had to determine
the specifications for the contracts and obtain the agreement of the various
pharmaceutical manufacturers. These agreements, called Distribution and Pricing
Agreements (DAPAs) were required in order for the Prime Vendors to distribute
products from these manufacturers. Additionally, the DAPAs set the maximum
price Prime Vendors can charge for each product. DPSC negotiates the best fixed
prices from manufacturers and dealers, weighing heavily in favor of technical
proficiency and favorable procurement history.
DAPAs contain the specific pharmaceutical items available through the
DPSC Prime Vendor contract. The Prime Vendor can only offer a product for
which a DAPA has been negotiated. As DoD medical logistics planners
increasingly rely on Prime Vendors, manufacturers are encouraged to list the
majority of their commercial products in the negotiated DAPA. As of September
1994, approximately 22,700 pharmaceutical and 65,800 medical/surgical items are
available through the Prime Vendor Program. The FSC items supported by the
Prime Vendor Program are listed in Appendix C. New products are constantly
being introduced into the commercial marketplace and incorporated into medical
standards by health providers. The DAPA allows enough flexibility to add or
delete commercial products based on the needs of the manufacturer and/or the
military health providers. Once DAPAs are established, a competitive bid process
is completed to select the regional Prime Vendors, with the DPSC Medical
Directorate being the contracting authority. The minimum contract is for one year
and the maximum contract commits the government to five years.
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D. THE PRIME VENDOR CONTRACT
Prime Vendor contracts are indefinite-delivery contracts as defined in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 16.5). The terms and conditions provide for
a modified requirements contract (FAR 16.503) used to fill all actual purchase
requirements for covered items for participating activities. DPSC is responsible
for awarding and administering these contracts with commercial distributors, as
well as paying the bills for items ordered.
The Prime Vendor will provide supply support for the bulk of the MTFs'
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical needs. MTFs covered by a regional Prime
Vendor are obligated to use the Prime Vendor to purchase any item included in the
DAPA. To obtain the best price and/or customer service, the MTF may use
another source if:
• the item is available at a lower price from a DoD depot;
• the item is carried through a DPSC medical electronic commerce
program, providing direct delivery from the manufacturer;
• the item is available from a mandatory source (i.e., Federal Prisoner
Industries, the National Institute for the Blind, or the National Institute
for the Severely Handicapped);
• the Prime Vendor cannot deliver the item within the 24 hour delivery
period due to the item being not in stock or back ordered by the
manufacturer; or,
• the item is available through the DPSC Mail Order Program.
MTF's may purchase items stocked by the Prime Vendor even if they are not
covered by a DAPA. In this instance, the Prime Vendor becomes an additional
(not mandatory) source of supply.
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There are minimum service levels set forth in the contract that each Prime
Vendor must achieve. First, Prime Vendor contract specifications require vendors
to maintain a 95 percent fill rate for contract items. "Fill rates are the average
percentage of orders fulfilled and delivered in accordance with a purchase order,
usually based on the number or lines or total dollars filled." (DISA, 1994) Since
the first contract was awarded, the Prime Vendors' fill rate typically averages
around 97 to 98 percent. Another very important aspect of the program is that the
95 percent fill rate must be achieved within 24 hours of placing the order, five
days per week. For emergency orders, this requirement is extended to six days
per week. The contracts allow for two emergency orders per month at no extra
cost. The cost of additional emergency orders will be charged to the ordering
activity, though there have been numerous instances where the Prime Vendor has
not charged for additional services. All emergency orders must be complete and
delivered within six hours. The Prime Vendor must be able to provide to as few
as two and as many as 15 delivery points within a geographical region. Finally,
the ordering activity should receive status of their order within two hours of
transmittal. The average status time of the program so far is 20 minutes. With
this rapid status time, customers are provided the benefit of knowing whether their
order will be filled, thus providing the opportunity of seeking other sources for
necessary supplies.
E. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
DPSC maintains its role as contract manager for regional Prime Vendor
contracts and as negotiator for DAPAs with various manufacturers. Once* the
negotiations, DAPAs and contract awards are completed military treatment
facilities are provided the necessary equipment and information they need to order
from their regional Prime Vendor. Under the terms of the contracts, the Prime
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Vendor provides the hardware, modems, software and technical training to
participating medical activities to input their orders. In some contracts the Prime
Vendor has provided bar code scanners as well.
The medical activity is now obligated to obtain all their Acquisition Advice
Code (AAC) "L" (local purchase non-stocked items) pharmaceuticals and
medical/surgical supplies covered by the contract from the Prime Vendor. If a
participating activity purchases pharmaceuticals and/or medical supplies from
another source, the terms and conditions of the contract are violated and the
government, through DPSC contracting offices, is placed at risk for monetary
damages.
The Prime Vendor lists their items in an electronic catalog, listing the
products and prices from the various manufacturers they carry. The price of each
item covered by the Prime Vendor Program is determined by the DAPA, with a
Prime Vendor distribution fee (negotiated in the contract) added to each item.
Additionally, since DPSC is the acquisition agency monitoring the Prime Vendors
in all regional areas, they also attach a one percent cost recovery factor. "The
price shown in the Prime Vendor electronic catalog is inclusive of all surcharges
and represents the delivered cost of the material." (BUMED SOP, 1993)
Ideally, before the medical activity begins purchasing items from its Prime
Vendor, they provide their demand history for the previous six weeks and continue
to provide demand requirements until their on-hand inventory is depleted. By the
time this inventory is consumed, the Prime Vendor is prepared to meet concurrent
demands of that activity. This prevents delays in initial Prime Vendor response
time during the transitional period. Once the ordering activity is on line, they can
check for item availability from the Prime Vendor's electronic catalog. If the
Prime Vendor stocks the same item from multiple vendors, the ordering activity
chooses the manufacturer offering the best price, regardless of the terms of the
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DAPA. Once all items have been selected, the medical activity places the order
using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). Copies of the invoices are sent
electronically to both the Prime Vendor and the administrating activity (DPSC).
Since all ordering is performed through EDI, there is significantly less paperwork
and time spent in purchasing and contracting activities.
The Prime Vendor quickly processes the order and then acknowledges
receipt and availability to the medical activity within two hours. The Prime
Vendor delivers the order within 24 hours, checking the order for accuracy and
completeness, and sends an electronic invoice to DPSC where it is matched to the
medical activity's order. The medical activity also notifies DPSC of receipt and
DPSC issues payment to the Prime Vendor. DPSC then provides central payment
to the Prime Vendors via electronic fund transfer for all its supported sites. Figure
















MedLog Warehouses, and DPSC Depots
Supplies
Material/Information Flow Under the
Prime Vendor Concept
Figure 2-3.
F. ADVANTAGES OI ffff
Adopting the Prime Vendor Program has netted many long term benefits for
DPSC, the services and military treatment facilities. Some of the most significant
advantages are listed here.
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1. Reduction in Procurement/Delivery Costs
DPSC maintains its role as contract manager for regional Prime Vendors
and as negotiator for Distribution and Pricing Agreements with various
manufacturers. As such, there is very little difference in unit prices of
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical item from that previously experienced. The
significant savings occur in reducing the overhead cost for managing the items at
the depots and the ability of vendor-provided information systems to support
multiproduct price comparisons. With MTFs receiving the majority of their
supplies from the Prime Vendors, DLA/DPSC depots are reducing their
inventories and thus eliminating the overhead costs they entailed. As a result, the
Prime Vendor provides the same supplies for "between 15 and 16 percent less than
the costs of the same supplies bought in bulk and distributed from Government
warehouses." (Bird, 1993)
Another significant difference occurs with the return-for-credit option.
Under the terms of the contract, a vendor is responsible to stock, deliver, and if
necessary accept return of all items specified in the contract. As items reach the
end of their shelf-life, and the medical facility believes their demand history
indicates they will not be used before expiration, the Prime Vendor will accept
return of the item and credit the facility for the price of the items. This avoids the
redistribution and disposal costs inherent in the original system, saving the medical
facility both the time and money of disposal.
2. Total Visibility of Demands
With the use of EDI, the Prime Vendor Program provides a robust, timely
audit capability. "For the first time, DoD will have total visibility of all demands
for medical supplies, which is essential for determining wartime consumption
estimates. " (Bird, 1993) With improved visibility, DPSC can better forecast future
requirements and use these forecasts to negotiate better prices with the
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manufacturers. Increased visibility will also reflect changing clinical practice
patterns, demographic trends, and the health status of the force. Additionally,
wartime usage can be tracked faster, allowing industry to better meet surge
requirements.
3. Standardized Inventories/Formularies
As better forecasts aid DPSC in improving price negotiations, and efforts
are taken specifically in standardization, DoD will begin establishing a
...uniform formulary for all military medical treatment facilities.
The intent is to have a uniform, clinically nonrestrictive formulary
which will serve as the basis for an equitable, consistent benefit
across the direct care system while ensuring access to quality, cost-
effective drug therapies... while military physicians can count on the
availability of these drugs, the drugs are ones to be used under
deployment conditions. Therefore, military practitioners will
become familiar with medications on the D-day significant drug list.
(Joseph, 1994)
Since deployed Navy and Marine Corps medical units are staffed with personnel
drawn from Navy MTFs, it becomes very important to provide the
pharmaceuticals and medical/surgical supplies most familiar to those doctors.
Since deploying units seldom control from which MTF their assigned doctors
originate, a nationwide, standardized formulary provides this familiarity.
4. Best Available Shelf Life
With DLA/DPSC's massive inventory, unless otherwise requested,
requisitions from the depots were often filled with items closest to their expiration.
Therefore, if the facility had excess stock, the items often ended up on the list for
disposal. With the Prime Vendor's 24 hour delivery requirement, excess stock is
becoming less commonplace and inventory turnover is much faster. The depots
in turn are reducing their stock of Prime Vendor supplied items, letting the Prime
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Vendor provide almost all items to the MTFs. The Prime Vendor, supplying
several MTFs in a region, also has faster inventory turnover. So, the MTFs get
their supplies from the Prime Vendor virtually direct from the manufacturer.
Though there are still some instances where supplies expire, the instances are far
fewer than with the previous system.
For the Medical Logistics Companies, DLA was required to supply items
with at least 18 months' shelf-life remaining. Though this met their requirement
for maintaining AMALs, it requires replacing items more often than direct receipt
from the manufacturer. With the Prime Vendor virtually supplying the items
direct from the factory, items received through this asset would be replaced less
often than with the current practice.
5. Labor Reductions
Large inventories require a large work force. As inventories are reduced,
less personnel are required to maintain them. With EDI, the procurement and
ordering process has been greatly simplified; so, far fewer personnel are required
to use the Prime Vendor system than with the previous setup. Finally, as sites
continue to convert more items and more commodities for purchase under the
Prime Vendor Program, the workload of their local finance offices decreases.
These positions can then be reprogrammed to other necessary functions or
eliminated to reduce personnel costs.
6. Faster Delivery Time
With the mandatory 24 hour delivery time inherent with the Prime Vendor
Program, supplies are received much faster than with UMMIPS or local purchase.
"Despite large inventories at the wholesale level, depot-retail delivery times are
frequently two weeks or longer for routine items." (Clayton, 1993) At its best,
UMMIPS promised delivery of routine items in 30 days, whereas a Prime Vendor
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can provide the same item in less than 24 hours. Under its highest priority,
UMMIPS could take as long as seven days to deliver. Even pursuing the open
purchase option, a medical facility waited an average of three days to receive
items. With Prime Vendor, the medical facility can receive two emergencies a
month in less than six hours.
G. DISADVANTAGES OF THE PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM
As with any business process, there are disadvantages in implementing a
new procurement system. Logisticians must weigh these factors and determine
what course of action is best for the organization. Accordingly, some
disadvantages are identified and discussed.
1. Less Stock Available for Emergency Use
One of the biggest advantages of the depot system is that the material, if
properly maintained, is immediately available to support U.S. forces in the event
of a contingency. Normal peacetime production of medical material falls far short
of that estimated to support the needs of a military conflict. Therefore,
Consumption requirements in a conflict must be met through a
combination of stockpiles of war reserve material and industrial base
production. War reserves contribute to the material provided by
current industrial production and are used to sustain the forces until
production reaches a high enough level to meet all requirements on
its own. (Richanbach & Bicksler, 1986)
DoD is rapidly expanding the Prime Vendor concept to cover as many medical
logistics functions as possible, including possible use of Prime Vendor for
maintaining prepositioned war reserves. However, to balance peacetime budget
concerns with immediate wartime requirements, DoD must assess the readiness
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and wartime sustainability implications of increased reliance on the commercial
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical manufacturers and distributors.
2. Reduction of the Retail Training Base
As previously mentioned, smaller inventories and reduced warehousing
requirements require less personnel. As staffs (and the military as a whole)
become smaller, military personnel may well find their medical support positions
converted to jobs for civilian employees. "The House Armed Services Committee
has been pushing the Pentagon to convert up to 10,000 active-duty jobs to
positions for civilians, a move the committee believes will improve readiness by
freeing up service members for combat units." (Maze, 1994) One of the terms of
the Prime Vendor contract is the responsibility to deliver and stock the supplies,
requiring less personnel at the MTF for this function. The resulting elimination
of medical logistics proficiency may mean deployed medical facilities will lack
experienced personnel to order, receive, maintain and issue pharmaceutical and
medical/surgical supplies. Though there are plans to extend the Prime Vendor to




IH. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
The constantly changing face of the world today and the significant threat
of low intensity conflict operations mandate farsighted logistics planning to ensure
effective support for contingencies and real-world operations. As it faces new
worldwide and domestic challenges, the Department of Defense must reassess its
logistics practices to determine whether current procedures and policies need to be
modified. To be truly prepared for tomorrow, the military must recognize the
diversity of the challenges it is likely to face. Identifying and confronting these
challenges is a necessary part of strategic planning. In short, the military no
longer has the luxury of focusing the majority of its defense efforts on a single
threat or a single region of the world. To determine how much war reserve to
maintain or how responsive our war reserves should be, we must first determine
what threatens our vital interests during the foreseeable future and how our
military should best prepare for these threats. This chapter examines some of the
international and domestic issues now affecting the need for prepositioned war
reserves.
A. GLOBAL CHALLENGES
The end of the 1980s brought with it the fall of the Berlin Wall. As sledge
hammers pounded at the masonry once dividing the world into two distinct
powers, the focus of 45 years of Cold War military planning was shattered.
Where American forces once stood on constant alert, ready to repel any attack by
Warsaw Pact forces dedicated to our demise, there now stands a group of nations
extending hands of friendship. Our nation, our citizens, and our allies are
optimistic about the prospects of long standing peace throughout the world. This
dynamically changing environment forces our nation's military to redefine its role
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in maintaining world peace. The Soviet threat once drove force planning, defense
budgets, training, strategy and tactics, equipment, research and development,
intelligence efforts, and troop deployments. It is no longer enough to point at the
world's only other major power and, because they were our sworn enemies, claim
them as the reason we conduct business as we do. "Those who plan U.S. military
forces must deal with a new world and establish, almost from scratch, what
military capabilities are available, what missions best employ them, and by what
criteria their effectiveness now needs to be judged." (Mazarr, 1993) Instead of
facing one major threat, and gearing our military industrial base toward defending
ourselves and our allies against it, military planning is now focused on four
potential scenarios: resumption of a malevolent Soviet Union or other power as
a global threat; one or more large scale regional conflict; peace enforcement/peace
keeping missions; and, humanitarian relief missions. Each scenario, discussed
below, requires a different rate and capability of response.
1. Resumption of a Global Threat
In terms of the threat imposed and the size of response required, the
resumption of some form of global threat would require the United States to
embark on a sizeable military reconstitution. Such a threat exists primarily in
those countries where experiments are underway to improve democratic
government and free market economics, most notably in Russia and/or China.
Due to the massive reduction in U.S. military capability over the last few years,
responding to this threat would require reconstituting our combat effectiveness.
President Bush, in his National Security Strategy of August 1991, defined strategic
reconstitution as "...the ability to generate a credible defense faster than any
potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense."
The difference, so far as maintaining war reserves for such a contingency
is concerned, is that the United States now has a much longer leadtime to prepare.
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For global war, the DoD maintained enough stocks so each theater commander-in-
chief could employ their forces alone and for some considerable time without
having to compete with other theaters for limited reserves or industrial surge.
Strategic reconstitution reaches the heart of America's ability to generate forces
and equip them for her defense and that of her allies. (Power, 1992) However,
a new global threat would easily be recognized in its infancy, giving the United
States sufficient time to reconstitute its forces, including prepositioned war
reserves should they have expired without replacement. If a resurgent global
power were the only world threat, the military could easily eliminate much of its
supply reserves and their associated holding costs. The commercial
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical industry, with the exception of certain
military-unique items, is more than capable of rebuilding military medical war
reserves. Such a strategy, however, requires the U.S. and its allies to determine
the response time available to reconstitute a credible defense capability, including
a realistic assessment of the industrial base capability, in time to meet the
emerging threat.
2. Large Scale Regional Conflicts
Unfortunately, the demise of the Soviet Union has not totally eliminated the
threat of conflict. Before the Soviet Union dissolved, the world was balanced
between two major camps. These camps acted as a control valve over many of
their satellite nations. Because the risk of a war escalating into a superpower
confrontation lurked behind any potential regional conflict, the major powers were
able to prevent many smaller wars from breaking out. Economic and political
instability threaten nations all over the world. Now that the bipolar power
structure has ceased to exist, operations against a greater variety of potential
aggressors is more likely today than at any time during the cold war. Add the
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proliferation of sophisticated weapons to this greater threat and planning for
military requirements becomes more challenging.
With regional conflicts it is the need to project power into areas important
to our interests, however unlikely it is a conflict would directly threaten the United
States. Maintaining the ability to defeat hostile regional powers is essential to
protecting smaller allied or friendly states. The need to prepare for a regional
conflict, perhaps on the scale of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
presents a credible excuse for expending limited fiscal resources. Like the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. may receive little advanced warning of attack and
require expeditious deployment of its forces. Even if intelligence sources
recognized a growing threat, the U.S. must decide at what point conventional
deterrence ends and deployment preparation begins. History suggests that we most
often deter the conflicts we predict and fight those we did not expect. As such,
we must have forces ready to face this type of threat should it occur.
This type of threat is the most militarily demanding, for once deterrence has
failed a sizeable military establishment is required to defeat the aggressor(s).
Understanding this threat does not necessarily make it simple to determine the size
of forces, or the amount of war reserves, the U.S. must maintain. President
Clinton's National Security Strategy states we must
...prepare our forces to confront this scale of threat, preferably in
concert with our allies and friends, but unilaterally if necessary. To
do this, we must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement
U.S. forward based and forward deployed forces, along with
regional allies, in halting an invasion and defeating the aggressor.
(Clinton, 1994)
U.S. military planners cannot give equal emphasis to all possible contingencies.
They possess neither the resources nor the force structure to build and maintain
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comprehensive capabilities for reconstitution, regional conflict, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian missions all at once. U.S. defense policy always attempts to
prioritize potential missions. A close analysis of the nature of various
contingencies faced by U.S. forces, and the U.S. interests at stake in them,
suggests that U.S. military forces ought to be designed, prepared, and their
development prioritized with primary emphasis on regional conflicts. Current
U.S. efforts are geared toward fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts (MRCs). (Aspin, 1993) Assuming these conflicts are unpredictable and
unexpected, responding to them will require a sizeable force with enough reserves
to keep them supplied until industry can answer the call.
A close examination of industry is required to determine just how
responsive they are to such a call. It is doubtful that the pharmaceutical and
medical/surgical industry can meet all immediate requirements of a U.S.
involvement to one major regional conflict. It is safe to assume, however, that
these industries can rapidly regenerate and replace the PWR issued in this
circumstance. Using the recent Persian Gulf conflict as an example, "preliminary
investigation indicates that despite some shortcomings, the industrial base was
reasonably responsive to the needs of the force." (DoD, 1991) Indeed, assuming
two MRCs do not break out simultaneously, it is feasible to maintain only the
medical reserves necessary to fight one MRC. Once those stocks are issued, we
could reasonably expect the commercial medical supply industry, through the
Prime Vendor Program, to timely reconstitute our medical PWR. Indeed,
reconstituting this PWR may well provide the impetus for preparing industry for
surge. The problem then, since the region cannot be predicted, becomes choosing
where best to maintain that PWR.
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3. Peace Enforcement/Peace Keeping Missions
"In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies, we must prepare
our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution."
(Clinton, 1994) We must work to shape and guide the forces of change in the
direction that best serves the needs of our nation. In doing so, the United States,
in concert with United Nations' efforts, will find itself increasingly involved in
punitive military actions in various regions of the world. Referred to as "peace
enforcement," these efforts are designed to enforce international rules and
principles on countries bent on brutalizing their neighbors or their own populace.
It remains in our best interests to contribute toward maintaining a stable and secure
world, a world that will advance the welfare of all peoples in an environment that
fosters economic development and furthers individual freedom and human rights.
As seen throughout the world today, international turmoil, aggression, and conflict
are not relegated to the pages of history. Drives for regional hegemony, resurgent
nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug trafficking, and terrorism are
certain to challenge international order during the final decade of this century. If
we are to deter conflict at the lower spectrums of violence, we must maintain
credible contingency and crisis response forces.
These missions require much less military force than that of major regional
conflicts. Our involvement may only consist of airlift, global communications and
logistical support. Never the less, peace keeping/peace enforcement brings with
it broad and ill-defined goals, and the danger of terrorism or violence against U.S.
forces is still prevalent. Regardless of the occasion, our involvement in peace
keeping will no doubt take place only after deliberate planning and identification
of objectives. Increased public scrutiny in such operations puts pressure on the
President to seek congressional approval before committing forces to peace
operations. "Congress is critical to the institutional development of a successful
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U.S. policy on peace operations." (Clinton, 1994) Given this guideline, the
decision process required to commit our forces to support peace operations will
give our forces ample time to prepare.
Regardless of the operation, the size of forces and required supplies for
peace missions falls far short of that currently maintained by the three services.
As with MRCs, medical supplies for peace operations could be immediately drawn
from one PWR source, with those stocks brought back to previous levels through
the Prime Vendor or direct industry procurement. Indeed, if sufficient warning
time is provided, the Prime Vendor could very well meet the requirements of such
a deployment without drawing from reserve stocks at all.
4. Humanitarian Relief Missions
Humanitarian missions most often call for the protection and distribution of
food and medical services and supplies, providing strategic lift for such
distribution, and rebuilding the country's government and logistical infrastructure.
Again, U.S. involvement will most likely be part of a UN commitment; the size
of our response will vary according to our share and the impact on our own
national security. Though most humanitarian efforts involve little military action,
the countries most likely to be affected are considered backward by western
standards. As such, military logistics plays a key role in the operation's success.
A great majority of humanitarian efforts involve medical support, primarily
in the areas related to treatment/prevention of disease and malnutrition. A
common characteristics of developing nations is that minimal health care is
available for a large part of the population. Medical units assigned to the effort
are authorized through Title 10 of the U.S. Code to provide their services for
humanitarian assistance. (Hogberg and Stone, 1993) These medical units possess
a level of sophistication and expertise unheard of in rural fringes of developing
nations and the personnel will can provide their services to the indigenous
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population. Besides temporarily alleviating the burden of nonexistent or minimal
health care for the general populous, medical personnel can develop medical
training programs for local healthcare providers.
One of the key factors affecting medical requirements planning for
humanitarian missions is the desired capability. As previously mentioned, the type
of care medical personnel can expect to provide vastly differs from a full scale
military involvement. Inherent in the medical PWR concept is the need to keep
medical supplies to treat combat casualties. Where some of these supplies can be
used in humanitarian operations, the quantity required differs from that of military
conflict. Additionally, there are some supplies particularly suited for humanitarian
operations that are not maintained in war reserves. A particular case in point is
the recent operation in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy. Before the USNS
Comfort (TAH-20) deployed as the primary casualty receiving ship for this
operation, it regenerated its Authorized Medical Allowance Lists. Using the Prime
Vendor, who achieved a 92 percent fill rate in three days, proved successful in this
regeneration. However, AMALs are designed to support a heavy surgical/trauma
patient mix involving wounds from bullets and other shrapnel. Once the mission
changed from a forced entry/amphibious operation to that of peacekeeping and
humanitarian support, the Comfort's clinicians quickly determined the AMALs
were incorrectly configured for such a role and recommended additional supplies
not contained in the AMALs.
Although participation in humanitarian operations is a growing role for the
military, maintaining medical supplies in war reserve for such a purpose is not,
and should not, be a priority. These missions involve uncertainty as to type and
amount of medical capability and most often allow sufficient warning time for
medical personnel to determine and procure necessary supplies. Again, given
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adequate warning, the industry and the Prime Vendor can provide timely response
to these missions, alleviating the need to maintain and use reserves.
B. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES
The end of the Cold War brought with it demands for domestic changes.
Our national security, no longer defined strictly in terms of military defense, now
focuses on economic stability and financial prosperity as well. With decreased
global threat comes demand for budget and military reform here at home.
Responding to a conflict anywhere on the globe requires different forms and/or
methods of response. Though the United States, as the strongest remaining world
superpower, continues to play a stabilizing role through geopolitical alliances
around the globe, it is still responsible to its citizens to meet domestic concerns.
Likewise, with a conscientious responsibility to deter aggression around the world,
its military must maintain a global response capability and credible threat.
1. The Budget
First and foremost among the nation's concerns is our economy.
Revitalizing the economy is essential if "we are to sustain our military forces,
foreign initiatives and global influence." (Clinton, 1994) Though the need to
sustain our military forces is recognized, the DoD is expected to maintain a force
from a greatly reduced share of the budget. As can be seen in Figure 3-1, fiscal
resources allocated to the Department of Defense have steadily declined. This
continues the real decline in defense spending that began around 1985. In constant
1994 budget dollars, the Fiscal Year 1995 budget is 35 percent below that of fiscal
year 1985, the peak year for DoD budget authority since the Korean War. With
DoD's share of the budget expected to fall by another 14 percent by 1998, relief




Figure 3-1. DoD Budget Authority Trend
(in constant 1994 Dollars)
Once again, as follows every major war in U.S. history, the military is
facing budget cuts which threaten the very strength of our armed forces. As their
budget share is reduced, Pentagon planners seek to reduce expenditures in the
current infrastructure to procure new, more effective weapons systems. Doing so
risks cutting the operations, maintenance and training budgets to a point of
producing a "hollow" force of low morale and effectiveness. To avoid this risk,
every organization must strive to save money where possible.
Attempting to save money can, however, be especially risky when it affects
medical reserves. With millions of dollars worth of expiring supplies requiring
replacement every year, budget constraints force cutbacks that threaten readiness.
Even at the height of the Reagan era DoD buildup, when money was considered
sufficient, the services were not filling their wartime medical requirements for
shelf-life items. In 1986, the Department of Defense Inspector General audited
medical supply support in the Pacific. They found that "only the Marine Corps
fully met its war reserve requirements for dated and deteriorative items." (DoD
IG, 1986) Failing to replace this critical war reserve saved the DoD millions of
dollars by reducing procurement and disposal costs, but had seriously degraded the
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services' ability to meet their wartime medical mission. In fact, Army hospitals
deploying to support Operation Desert Shield lacked much of their initial medical
supply issue, a 10-day authorization of potency and dated (P&D) items, such as
narcotics, anesthesia, antibiotics, and X-ray film. The Army had failed to
maintain sufficient quantities due to "the high cost of replacing P&D items when
their shelf-life expired." (GAO, August 1993)
It is up to individual military bases and organizations to cut costs where
feasible and, if possible, without adversely effecting readiness. Military medicine
and military treatment facilities, by adopting the Prime Vendor Program, are
saving defense dollars while improving healthcare. Yet, at the same time they are
cutting costs, the cost of healthcare is rising.
Military facilities are similar to private medical facilities in some
ways. Both are responsible for providing quality inpatient and
outpatient health care, use the same or similar supplies, and provide
training to physicians. In addition, both must control the cost of
health care as prices for supplies and equipment escalate. (GAO,
1991)
Since costs are rising, emphasis is still on further reductions. These same rising
costs are affecting the maintenance of AMAL war reserves as well. Since
Aguigam (1991) completed his thesis, where he identified a replacement cost of
approximately two million dollars for Camp Pendleton stocks alone, the Marine
Corps has reduced its AMAL requirements by approximately 58 percent. Where
once the projected casualty rate for a worst case scenario was 20,000 in 60 days,
that rate is now estimated to be 8,381 personnel. (CMC WASHINGTON DC
160101 SEP 92) The increasing cost of pharmaceuticals since then have driven
the Fiscal Year 1995 replacement cost for those reduced AMAL requirements to
1991 levels, with no relief in sight.
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The shrinking defense budget, while providing the country with a "peace
dividend," threatens our country's military readiness. Despite the best efforts of
medical planners, the stock of medical PWR continues decrease due to lack of
funds. Like all procurement functions, we must determine if we are trying to
maintain too much medical material. The pharmaceutical and domestic
transportation industries are responsive enough to meet all but the most military-
unique initial requirements.
With smaller budgets, we will find it harder and harder to maintain the wide
balance of capabilities required to counter sudden, unexpected geopolitical
challenges and newly emerging threats or capabilities. This will place a premium
on early political decisions. Although these challenges demand U.S. action, the
need to husband scarce resources suggests we must carefully select the means and
quantity of our prepositioned war reserves.
2. Strategic Lift
Throughout the Cold War, the political and economic climate prohibited the
United States from forward-basing sufficient forces and equipment to counter
potential military threats in all areas of strategic importance. In coordination with
its allies, the United States relied on rapid deployment of military forces, and their
supplies, based in the United States or from overseas bases and depots.
Unfortunately, "America has undervalued the role of logistics in formulating
military strategies, emphasizing combat force structure at the expense of logistics
force structure." (Menarchik, 1993) Strategic mobility has three components:
sealift, airlift, and prepositioning. Meeting initial transportation requirements is
often the most difficult part of defending America's vital interests. As such, its
capability and impact on medical reserve requirements is discussed.
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a. Sealift
Sealift has historically accounted for the majority of all military cargo
transport requirements. Military planners, having watched the U.S. Merchant
Marine drop from 578 major ships in 1978 to less than 200 today, increasingly
rely on the commercial transportation industry to meet wartime needs. Few of
these planners foresaw the changing face of the commercial sector. The
commercial shipping industry is moving away from self-sustaining ships capable
of offloading breakbulk cargo and unit equipment/vehicles at austere ports. To
maintain their competitive advantage, shipping companies are converting their
fleets to containerized transport, which require modern port facilities. Though a
detriment to moving military unique equipment, containers can be used to move
various types of medical material. The problem here is that much of the world's
sealift is limited to less than 24 knot speeds. For operations like the Gulf War,
resupply could take over three weeks just to complete transit. Although good for
moving medical supplies and equipment in preparation for a future land battle, it
is not a responsive method of medical resupply. Sealift' s greatest contribution to
the medical effort is reducing the demand on available airlift, freeing aircraft for
rapidly resupplying critical medical supplies.
The DoD published a Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) in January
1992, identifying serious deficiencies in current strategic sealift capability. The
ship mix in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is now acknowledged as
inadequate and, as fewer Americans enter the merchant service each year, the
aging fleet has fewer able bodied seamen left to man it. (Hayes, 1992) Realizing
there is no substitute for sealift, the MRS recommended adding 22 ships to' the
nation's deployment forces. Regardless of this additional lift, the nation lacks the
necessary sealift to simultaneously commit its forces to two MRCs. The U.S. will
have to choose which conflict to support until such time as the necessary forces
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are in place, at which time this new fleet can be used to transport military
equipment and supplies to a second MRC.
b. Airlift
Airlift has always been planned as the first response toward meeting
the initial surge of a U.S. deployment. The advantage of airlift is, of course, its
speed of delivery. Responding to regional conflicts requires the ability to get the
most capability there at the best possible speed. As long as forces are traveling
light, airlift cannot be surpassed in providing this capability. However, its
limitations as a form of long term sustainment has always been realized. As such,
strategic planners only project the use of airlift for transporting five to ten percent
of materials and equipment during large-scale operations. The remaining
requirements are met with sealift.
The Military Airlift Command, with its aging fleet of C-5s, C-141s,
and C-130s had, until Operation Desert Shield, historically provided the majority
of necessary airlift for world crises response. The Gulf War provided the first
ever test of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), requiring commercial airlines to
provide aircraft to help meet the vast, long-distance air logistics requirements.
The CRAF, initiated by Executive Order 10219 in 1951, was designed to provide
financial support to the commercial air industry in return for helping meet just
such a contingency requirement. The airlines, once quick to take advantage of this
subsidy, learned the consequences of their actions during the Gulf War. As a
result of having their aircraft tied up transporting troops and equipment half-way
around the world, their profits were severely curtailed. Because of this profit loss,
the future of the CRAF program is now in doubt as airlines find other ways to
finance their businesses.
Airlift, able to reach the farthest reaches of the world in a relatively
short time, is important to the military medical community for two reasons: to
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resupply medical equipment and supplies and to transport severely wounded
personnel to more capable facilities outside of the combat area. With airlift
capability steadily declining, it may take longer for U.S. forces to deploy. When
the U.S. responds to a crisis, it will have to prioritize requirements for the limited
airlift. Immediate response to aggression usually requires placing combat forces
in theater first, as evidenced in the Gulf War, followed by the support train.
Unfortunately, this logistical tail includes the medical units. It is not advisable to
enter a war until the forces have the medical capability in place to treat the
wounded.
The late twentieth-century soldier does not expect to be left to die of
his wounds on the battlefield. Today the victim is unlucky who,
escaping death outright, succumbs to the effects of his wounds.
(Keegan, 1976)
Sending a unit to war without the necessary medical personnel, equipment and
supplies risks every American unlucky enough to be wounded. The politicians and
citizens of our country will not tolerate Americans facing war without such
medical support. Former Secretary Of Defense Les Aspin outlined the initial
stages of U.S. Combat Operations as halting the invasion, followed by a build up
of U.S. combat power in the theater before decisively defeating the enemy (Aspin,
1993). This initial stage is required as much from a lack of responsive lift as it
is from budgetary constraints preventing abundant U.S. forces from being based
near potential trouble spots. Logistics planners will have to first use the limited
airlift to place deterrence forces, then concentrate on moving additional combat
forces and logistics support into the theater. Even in the Gulf War, "...the
military strategy depended on the logistics buildup, and logistics determined the
timing of the military strategy." (Menarchik, 1993) U.S. forces will build from
a deterrence, holding off on their attack until a balanced military force is present
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to attack the enemy. As the mission of the deployed force evolves from deterrence
to combat operations, the medical support requirements will expand. In an
indirect fashion, the shortage of strategic airlift has given medical logistics
planners some leeway. As Desert Storm showed, America has plenty of bombs,
bullets, planes, tanks and troops, but barely enough lift for timely deployment to
meet its declared strategies. While the U.S. can immediately place the forces
needed to deter and defend a strategic area, it takes time to build up an assault
capability. Since AMALs are not depleted until actual casuualties are treated, this
deployment delay gives the pharmaceutical and medical supply industry, as well
as the Prime Vendors, around three to four months to reconstitute medical reserves
before the items must be in the combat zone.
c. Land-Based Prepositioning
Land-based prepositioning began in 1961 with Army assets staged in
Germany. Designed to prestage supplies and equipment for use against a Soviet
invasion, its necessity is now in question. Despite its original design, the U.S.
Army Medical Materiel Center Europe (USAMMCE) played a key role in the
Persian Gulf conflict. Medical supplies were transported from its vast 93-acre
medical depot in Pirmasens, Germany, to Saudi Arabia at a rate of 3,000 tons a
month. (Scott, 1991) Even though this stockpile of supplies was on the wrong
continent, its location actually proved a bonus. Because movement from Europe
to Saudi Arabia was much quicker than from the U.S., USAMMCE significantly
enhanced post deployment support of field units. Field orders were filled much
faster than from CONUS based depot stocks. Unfortunately, this resupply was
often threatened by lack of military transportation. Equipment or other supplies
receiving a higher priority on flights to the area of operations meant backlogged
medical supplies in Germany.
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Prepositioning equipment at strategic locations, and the necessary
personnel to support it, can be a strategic paradox. Effective prepositioning
requires staging U.S. forces in an area where our vital interests are threatened.
Unfortunately, few nations wish to antagonize an aggressive neighbor and most are
averse to permanently stationed forces from another nation within their sovereign
borders. Unless the U.S. prepositions its necessary equipment and supplies in or
near the correct region, it faces a significant logistical challenge when countering
aggression. In remote locations such as Norway, a stockpile located in the wrong
place could be more inaccessible than having it in the continental U.S.
It is therefore a matter of weighing up the balance of advantage to
be gained by prepositioning stockpiles in the projected area of
operations, against the possibility that the next war will not be fought
in that area at all. Even if they are not exactly in the right place, by
being on the right continent, or area of that continent, much
movement effort can usually be saved. (Thompson, 1991)
With the U.S. working to reduce the number of overseas bases, unless it can
maintain cooperative agreements with its allies to maintain these stockpiles,
prepositioning may prove too politically and financially expensive.
d. Afloat Prepositioning
Afloat prepositioning is made up of two elements. The first element
is the 13 ships of the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF).
Divided into three squadrons, each has enough combat and combat support
equipment and supplies to fully equip and sustain 16,500 Marines for 30 days, and
can reach any trouble spot in less than 10 days. The second element, courtesy of
the MRS, is the growing number of Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) ships used
by other services to prestage common sustainment and support items, stationed in
the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Afloat prepositioning is the answer
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to having the right forces at the right place at the right time, ready to halt an
aggressor before he can take tactical advantage over a relatively vulnerable host
nation or U.S. enabling forces.
Both the MPF and APF carry a 30 day supply of combat support
stocks. Each MPF squadron can support roughly one third of a MEF for 30 days,
while the APF is designed to support a tailorable corps consisting of five divisions.
This support includes consumable medical supplies. The APF will be used to
place forces anywhere in the world requiring U.S. response, while the original
MPF concept is to have one squadron respond to its respective area of
responsibility. This concept was overlooked during the Gulf War when all three
squadrons supported U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of original intent,
both forces provide deployed American forces substantial initial capability,
including medical support, and are the mainstays of military preparedness and
deterrence.
3. Environmental Concerns
American citizens are rapidly growing concerned about industry and
military disposal practices. Just within the last decade, headlines boldly displayed
Navy disregard for medical waste disposal at sea. Bags of syringes and vials were
pictured washed up on the nation's shoreline. Though rightfully placed, this
growing concern increases the cost burden of proper waste disposal. Although
now only a small percentage of an item's replacement value, disposal costs are
expected to rise as industry faces increasing environmental safety constraints.
Although the MedLog Companies expend a great deal of effort to redistribute their
supplies before expiration, often giving the supplies to local military treatment
facilities free of charge, they still face expiring items requiring disposal. As
disposal costs rise, funds available for maintaining AMALs are burdened, limiting
the capability to maintain readiness.
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4. The Industrial Base
Medical material is vital to the delivery of medical care in both peace and
war. Medical supplies are literally a life-or-death commodity essential to combat
support. Without crucial medical supplies and equipment, the Service Medical
Departments could not accomplish their missions. "It is important to treat the
wounded quickly and efficiently, not only to maintain morale, but also in order to
return as large a percentage of treated men to the battle as quickly as possible."
(Thompson, 1991) To insure adequate supplies are available, the DoD and the
services must examine expected requirements, current war reserve policies, and
industrial base preparedness plans to insure adequate medical readiness and
wartime sustainability.
Each service's medical department must provide or arrange for the
provision of medical supplies for its individual service. In 1986, a full-time
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Medical Readiness was appointed to
coordinate all aspects of medical readiness for the three services, which has
improved inter-service coordination for medical planning, training and logistics.
Similarly, field medical equipment is being standardized between the services.
Traditionally, the services plan to meet wartime consumption requirements
through a combination of war reserve stockpiles and industrial base production.
War reserves are used to sustain the forces until production reaches a high enough
level to meet all requirements on its own. Although many studies have concluded
the pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supply industry can meet wartime
commitments, most war reserves are based on requirements for large-scale war
against the former Soviet Union. Little is available evaluating the industry's
ability to meet initial deployment requirements for one or two regional threats and
whether war reserves are even necessary to adequately respond to this new threat.
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At the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, Iraq was considered the
world's fourth largest land force. As such, barring the rise of a new superpower
threat, the U.S. and her allies have successfully eliminated the largest major
regional threat they can expect for some time. Even in this relatively large scale
deployment,
...despite some shortcomings, the industrial base was reasonably
responsive to the needs of the force. These, and similar instances
reinforce the continuing requirement to balance our war reserve
programs and depot production capabilities with a realistic
assessment of industrial base capability. (DoD, 1991)
An August 1993 GAO report confirmed this assessment for Operation Desert
Shield except for the procurement of military-unique items, with four items
proving specifically difficult to procure: (1) Mark I Nerve Agent Antidote Kit; (2)
atropine injector (part of the Mark I Kit but also issued separately); (3)
pyridostigmine bromide tablets (pre-treatment for nerve gas), and (4) immune
serum globulin (a vaccine to boost the immune system). Additionally, a 1988
National Defense Study identified production of the autoinjectors used with the
Mark I Kit as inadequate due to a patent on the device and its military specific
design.
With the exception of these military-unique items, industry is capable of
meeting wartime surge demands. It is up to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs to determine whether this response can meet expected deployment
surge without adversely affecting civilian hospital requirements. If so, the military
will find significant cost savings by reducing war reserve requirements for items
common in commercial practice.
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IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
Authorized Medical/Dental Allowance Lists (AMALs/ADALs) constitute
the authorized allowances of medical and dental equipment and consumable
supplies required to accomplish healthcare support missions under combat
conditions. A description of the AMALs held by MedLog Companies is included
in Appendix A.
AMALs and ADALs are identified with the primary function they
are designed to support; i.e., operating room, ward, laboratory, etc.
AMALs are further divided into those containing equipment and
those containing consumable supplies. For ease in identification,
they are assigned a three digit number of the 600 series; e.g.,
AMAL 618 contains laboratory equipment, and AMAL 619 contains
laboratory consumable supplies. (FMFM 4-50, 1990)
AMALs are maintained to ensure there are adequate initial stocks on hand
to support deployed forces until such time as industry can meet the increased
demand. However, as discussed in Chapter m, current quantities are based on a
short-notice global war with a power that no longer threatens our great nation.
Additionally, while U.S. strategic lift is insufficient to support a significant U.S.
deployment, there have been dramatic improvements in both the quantity and
quality of domestic transportation systems. Since 1980, the number of motor
carriers has almost tripled, (GAO, November 1993) and rapid-delivery air freight
services have thrived. Our robust intranation transportation industry provides the
military with an incredible capability to rapidly redistribute war reserves within the
country. This chapter provides alternatives, comparing trade-offs and cost-benefit
analysis, to current medical logistics practices.
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A. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO
No list of proposed alternatives would be complete without offering to
maintain the status quo. This section sets the benchmark for comparing potential
improvements, as well as showing the current practices and maintenance costs.
1. MEF 60 Days of Supply
Each Medical Logistics Company, under the direction and guidance of the
Commanding Officer of their respective Supply Battalion, Force Service Support
Group, is tasked with providing for the receipt, storage, management, and issue
of Class VTII supplies and equipment to all medical and dental units and elements
of the MEF. To accomplish this, they maintain inventory and conduct quality
control, stock rotation, and general management of AMALs/ADALs prior to issue
to using units. They are also responsible to provide appropriate repair and
maintenance for medical and dental equipment of the MEF.
AMALs/ADALs are warehoused in modular form to facilitate rapid mount
out and resupply response. However, a number of factors, such as warehouse
space and the manpower-intensive nature of AMAL/ADAL management, impose
limits on the number of modules which may be packaged and maintained at any
given time and place. The MedLog companies, therefore, are only required to
maintain a minimum of 25 percent of consumable AMALs in modular form.
Referred to as "Out-The-Door" (OTD) blocks, this 25 percent requirement is what
is initially issued to deploying units. The quantity of OTD AMALs held by 1st
Medical Logistics Company, as well as the minimum 25 percent OTD required,
are shown in Table 1 . The remaining 45 DOS of Class VIE consumable material
is maintained as bulk line item supplies and deploys with MedLog personnel when
strategic lift is available. A list of 1st MedLog Company's Prime Vendor











619 Laboratory 37 $ 92,199 26 $ 64,789
624 Blood Bank 32 29,303 26 23,809
630 Pharmacy 14 68,583 13 63,684
632 Shock Surgical 57 364,555 38 243,037
634 Ward 65 278,704 54 231,539
636 Aid Station 60 534,781 42 374,346
638 Prev Medicine 2 6,431 1 3,216
640 O/R 53 1,213,372 33 755,496
649 X-Ray 37 847,071 26 8,921
699 Sick Call 22 99,242 15 67,665
Total Value $3,534,241 $1,836,502
Table 1. 1st MedLog Company's Out-The-Door Requirements
AMAL Description Unit Value
MEF Qty
Required Total Value
619 Laboratory $ 2,492 101 $251,692
624 Blood Bank 916 103 94,348
630 Pharmacy 4,899 50 244,950
632 Shock Surgical 6,396 150 959,400
634 Ward 4,288 215 921,920
636 Aid Station 8,913 168 1,497,384
638 Prev Medicine 3,216 3 9,648
640 Operating Room 22,894 131 2,999,114
649 X-Ray 343 102 34,986
699 Sick Call 4,511 60 270,660
Total Value of AMALs Maintained (for 60 DOS) $7,284,102
Est Avg Annual Replacement Cost (for 60 DOS) $2,428,034
Table 2. 1st MedLog Company's Prime Vendor Supportable
AMAL Requirements and Values
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Budget restrictions and the expense of these short shelf-life AMALs has
prevented 1st Medical Logistics Company from actually maintaining the complete
requirements. As of 8 November 1994, 1st MedLog Company faced an unfunded
shortfall of almost seven million dollars, with no immediate relief. With a three
year average shelf-life (Aguigam, 1991), the estimated average annual replacement
cost for a MEF is $2.4 million, not counting disposal cost. With budget shortfalls
restricting the amount of supplies maintained, less are maintained. The cost of
replacing only the expiring stocks currently on hand at 1st MedLog Company is
almost $1.9 million. Neither of these figures includes the cost of replacing the
required 16,500 viles, at $6.71 a vile ($1 10,715 total), of immune serum globulin;
a military-unique item identified in the August 1993 GAO report as difficult to
procure during the Persian Gulf build up. First MedLog issued their entire stock
of immune globulin during preparations for I MEF's deployment to Kuwait in
August 1994.
2. Maritime Propositioning Force
In addition to the three MedLog Companies, the Marine Corps also
maintains the three squadrons of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Each
squadron maintains enough combat and combat support equipment and supplies to
sustain approximately one third of a MEF for 30 days. Though the squadrons are
assigned to support the MEF in their respective regions, all three were downloaded
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and ships from two squadrons
were used in support of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The composition of
each squadron is shown in Appendix B.
A total of 26 AMAL/ADAL types are required for the MPF ships, with a
total of 326 blocks per squadron. Each ship undergoes a 29 day maintenance
period every 30 months in Blount Island, Florida. During this one month period,
supplies and equipment are examined and repaired/replaced. Once the ships
50
complete their cycle, the supplies are not replaced again until required for a
contingency or upon their return to Blount Island. The contractor for this
maintenance is required to maintain 100 percent Class VIII attainment, less
refrigerated items, narcotics and precious metals. Medical items must have 18
months or more shelf-life remaining by the date the ship sails. MedLog companies
and MEF medical planners are provided the necessary reports to aid in their Fly-In
Echelon (FIE) requirements. The FIE, which is the responsibility of the deploying
MedLog company, are those items not carried on the MPF ships and those items
that expire if the squadron responds 18 months out from the cycle. The total
AMAL density levels and value on the MPF squadrons are shown in Table 3.
3. Norway Air Landed MEB (NALMEB)
The Marine Corps also maintains enough equipment and supplies to support
a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in Norway for 30 days. The Norway Air
Landed MEB is the result of a DoD-directed program based upon a memorandum
of understanding between Norway and the United States signed in January of 1981
.
The NALMEB is deployed in Air Force aircraft to reception areas in central
Norway prior to hostilities. This method of deployment facilitates the rapid
reinforcement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's northern flank. It
enhances strategic mobility by decreasing the amount of airlift required to move
a MEB and reduces force closure from weeks to days.
Consumable medical supplies are also part of this cache of prepositioned
supplies. Expiration dates of these stocks, unlike the MPF, are strictly
maintained. Every 18 months personnel replace expiring material from every
AMAL module. Replenishment items are ordered, properly packaged, and
shipped to Norway quarterly. The total AMAL density levels and value of the









619 Laboratory 42 14 24
624 Blood Bank 60 20 14
630 Pharmacy 33 11 9
632 Shock Surgical 87 29 29
634 Ward 129 43 25
636 Aid Station 90 30 32
640 Operating Room 90 30 25
649 X-Ray 42 14 21
Total Value $4.31M $1.44M $1.27M
Table 3 . AMAL Density and Values for MPF and NALMEB
B. PRIME VENDOR VERSUS CURRENT SYSTEM
1. Standard Prime Vendor Contract
a. Overhead Savings
As the DPSC and DLA increasingly rely on the Prime Vendor
Program to supply MTFs with needed dated and deteriorative supplies, they
anticipate significant reduction of their own stocks. It is indeed conceivable that
DPSC/DLA will also procure their stocks through the Prime Vendor. If this
occurs, procuring war reserve AMALs through DPSC/DLA would only add a
middleman to the process. DPSC's overhead cost for managing operations adds
a significant added costs to the current system. The MedLog companies would be
wise to adopt the Prime Vendor as a single supply source, thereby reducing costs
at least 15 percent over the same items purchased through DPSC depots. (Bird,
1993) This equates to a savings of roughly $350,000 per MedLog company per
year over the current system. Applying this same cost savings to the MPF and
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NALMEB obtains an annual reduction of $215,000 and $64,000 respectively.
Total savings to the Marine Corps would be $1.33 million per year.
b. Maximum Shelf-Life Savings
Supplies procured through DPSC do not enjoy the benefit of
maximum obtainable shelf-life gained through the Prime Vendor Program. A
factor involved in the current system is the variation in remaining shelf-life for
dated and deteriorative items received from DPSC stocks. DPSC, also concerned
with reducing financial loss replacing expiring stock, currently fills MedLog
company requisitions with their older stock. As long as the stock has 1 8 months
shelf-life remaining, it's considered sufficient to meet AMAL concerns. For
MedLog companies, this means they have to replace expiring stock more often
than had they received it directly from the factory. In the worst case scenario,
MedLog Company could purchase an item from DPSC and replace it 18 months
later, whereas the same item purchased initially from the Prime Vendor would be
replaced in three years. The end result, barring price changes and ignoring
disposal costs, would be a 50 percent savings; a potential of $1 .2 million per MEF
per year.
c. Bar Code Technology Savings
Aguigam (1991) identified cost savings that 1st MedLog Company
could achieve through adopting Bar Code technology. His analysis illustrated that
the higher accuracy from using bar codes resulted in potential savings of between
one and five percent of average annual inventory. Another advantage of the Prime
Vendor Program is that, if required, the Prime Vendor provides both the
hardware, software, and training for using bar codes in inventory tracking. With
current Marine Corps Order 6700.2 requiring each MEF to maintain an average
seven million dollar annual inventory, and the Prime Vendor providing the bar
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code equipment, there is more savings to be uncovered here. At minimum, the
I MEF could save another $73,000 by using the Prime Vendor Program. If the
full five percent benefit of bar code technology Aguigam identified were realized,
over $360,000 could be saved. Applying this to the three Marine Corps MEFs
implies a range of savings from $218,000 to $1.1 million. Use the same figures
on MPF and NALMEB and another $56,000 to $279,000 could be saved. Total
savings to the Marine Corps would be between $274,000 and $1.4 million.
2. Prime Vendor Program with Retum-for-Credit
As pharmaceuticals and medical/surgical items near the end of their shelf-
life, the MedLog companies attempt to redistribute them to military treatment
facilities, often in the form of a free issue. Once the items expire, the companies
are faced with significant disposal costs. Expired drugs are disposed of through
the Pine Bluff Arsenal or the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office.
Returning this material to DPSC for credit is currently not an option. There is,
however, a return-for-credit option offered by the Prime Vendor. Though
designed for use by MTFs, whose returns are considered minimal under correct
use of the Prime Vendor, the same program could prove advantageous to
maintaining medical reserves.
The Marine Corps must consider the differences crediting MTF returns
versus returns from a war reserve program. When an MTF has a return, it is
most likely due to changes in demand for the item. Unless the MEF responds to
a contingency, only a fraction of the total AMAL requirement is consumed.
Under perfect conditions, over two million dollars worth of expiring
pharmaceuticals and medical/surgical items would be returned each year. The
Prime Vendor is in business to make money and there is no profit in a return-for-
credit program of this magnitude. The only way to convince the Prime Vendor
to take on a task of this nature would be to offer a monetary incentive in the
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contract. The cost benefit in this case would depend on this monetary incentive.
Under the assumptions of this research, any amount reasonably less than the
current $2.4 million per MEF estimated annual cost would benefit in both
replacement value and disposal costs.
C. CONSOLIDATION OF MEDICAL LOGISTICS
Another recommendation from the GAO's 1991 report was to consolidate
medical logistics functions, in effect cutting redundancy. As the past eight years
have shown, deep budget cuts are inevitable. The cost of not cutting redundant
capabilities will be reductions in unique and, possibly, essential forces. Indeed,
with the end of the Cold War and our only threat that of at most two major
simultaneous regional conflicts, there are two reasons why the Marine Corps
maintains 60 days of medical reserves at each MEF, plus three MEB's worth of
land-based and afloat prepositioning. First, the Marine Corps will not risk having
enough supplies to support two simultaneous MRCs; and second, the Corps desires
enough stocks to employ each theater's MEF alone and for some considerable time
without resupply from the continental United States. With the change of strategic
focus from global to regional conflict, we need only maintain enough initial stocks
to last until theater forces are resupplied from CONUS or from other prepositioned
stocks, positioned to be moved quickly from one region to another. (CJCS, 1993)
1. The Value of Consolidation
With regional war as the major threat in the world, the chance is small that
two MEFs would be deployed at the same time. The Marine Corps could cut its
consumable medical war reserve stocks by two thirds, enough to support one
MEF, and continue to maintain its afloat and overseas land-based prepositioned
stocks. Since a MEB is roughly equivalent to one third of a MEF, the three MPF
squadrons combined have enough supplies to last a MEF for 30 days. Add to
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these prepositioned stocks the single 60 day supply of AMALs and there are
consumable medical supplies available for three months of combat operations.
Since medical supplies are measured by estimated casualties, the 90 day clock
doesn't start ticking until actual fighting begins. Additionally, DPSC is still
required to maintain enough medical reserves to support deployed forces for 120
additional days. Unless another MRC simultaneously breaks out, industry will
have ample time to surge production and replace issued supplies and combat
demands. By the time the needed lift could be freed to support two MRCs,
industry would have caught up with demand and replenished reserves. As such,
one cache of medical reserves is sufficient to meet the demands of the current
world situation. Add up the savings and the Marine Corps would have $4.8
million a year to invest in new equipment and training.
2. Better Asset Visibility
Another problem LT Aguigam identified in his 1991 thesis was that human
error was inevitable when dealing with inventories. There are times when the vast
quantity and variety of the inventory a MedLog company is required to maintain
overcomes their dedicated personnel. When these personnel overlook expiring
medications, they miss the chance to redistribute it to other medical facilities.
Maintaining three separate inventories means even less visibility for available
redistribution. Even if caught before the end of their shelf-life, when the MedLog
finally does announce availability, the items may well be too close to expiration
to be efficiently redistributed. Material redistributed from war reserve material
stocks "must have sufficient shelf life remaining so that the peacetime user can
rotate through his own inventory" (DoD IG, 1986). The actual dollar value lost
depends on the skill of the personnel and the quality of their inventory practices.
With three inventories, the opportunity for inventory errors are inevitable.
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Consolidation will reduce this margin for error by two thirds, again saving support
dollars better used for operations.
3. Meeting Deployment Requirements
Deciding where the Marine Corps should consolidate its consumable
medical reserves becomes the next major issue. With unacceptably long lead times
required to replace medical equipment reserves, the three MEFs must continue to
maintain its AMAL equipment blocks. This requires some MedLog infrastructure
to remain at the MEF level regardless of where the reserves are located. Since the
U.S. can not predict where in the world its forces will next respond, choosing the
ideal location is impossible. This is where the commercial transportation plays a
key role. The DoD could negotiate contracts with commercial vendors to provide
wartime support, similar to the way it plans to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to
supplement military airlift assets. The private sector already has adequate private
trucking, rail and air fleets that would ensure timely distribution of the medical
reserves in the event of mobilization. Given time to prepare the necessary
contracts, domestic transportation could move medical PWR to any destination
required. Whether the cargo was transported to the point of embarkation, or to
an area near the combat theater, America and her allies have the transportation
infrastructure to move anything anywhere in the world. Unless improvements in
the shelf-life requirements ofMPF ships are made, the problem facing the Marine
Corps is outfitting the initial deploying forces.
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D. REDUCING CURRENT REQUIREMENTS TO 30 DAYS OF SUPPLY
1. Maintaining Crisis Response Capability
Again, maintaining the MPF and NALMEB at their current levels, the
Marine Corps could reduce current MEF requirements to maintaining supplies to
support the MEF for 30 days. This would reduce each MEF's consumable AMAL
burden by 50 percent, yet have little impact on the Marine Corps' ability to
support deployed forces. With this alternative, each MEF would maintain the
same quantity of "out-the-door" AMAL blocks, keeping the remaining 15 day
supply in bulk issue. Should one MEF deploy, the "out-the-door" blocks could
be immediately issued to deploying units, with MedLog personnel following with
the remaining bulk issue. Once the AMALs were issued, the MedLog companies
could reconstitute an additional 30 day supply through the Prime Vendor. This
would accomplish two immediate objectives: it builds up necessary supplies for
rapid, continued support of deployed forces; and, it immediately prompts the
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical industry to increase production capacity to
meet potential surge demands. Should medical supplies be required for combat,
military and commercial transportation assets can be used to move AMALs from
other MedLog companies. It is important to note this is practiced on a smaller
scale when shortages force MedLog companies to request contingency support
from their counterparts in other MEFs. Even without dipping into another MEF's
"out-the-door" AMALs, there is a total of 60 days of supply available through this
means, not including the supplies available on the MPF ships or in NALMEB
stocks. The MedLog company(ies) that provided the added requirement could,
through their regional Prime Vendor, reconstitute their own bulk AMALs paid for
with contingency funding or fund redistribution from the deploying MEF. Since
the AMALs/ADALs are based on casualties treated, determining the cost of
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reduced requirements is simply a matter of halving the previous values, listed in
Table 2. Table 4 shows the new total value of maintaining 30 DOS of AMALs
and the reduced average estimated replacement cost for this alternative. Each
MEF would thus save up to $1 .2 million annually, for a total AMAL maintenance
cost savings of $3.6 million. With the Prime Vendor Program another $540,000
would be saved. If the Prime Vendor were to supply bar code scanning
equipment, the total savings to the Marine Corps would be at least $4.3 million
a year.
Total Value of AMALs Maintained (for 30 DOS) $3,642,051
Est Avg Annual Replacement Cost (for 30 DOS) $1,214,017
Table 4. Value and Replacement Costs for 30 DOS of AMALs
2. Maintaining the MedLog Infrastructure
A disadvantages of the Prime Vendor Program, identified in Chapter n, was
reduction in the medical logistics training base. With fewer personnel involved in
the ordering and maintenance process, fewer personnel are available to support
deployed medical facilities. Consolidation of AMALs to one location further
reduces this training base, placing a potential stumbling block in the way of
deployment support. One advantage to merely reducing each MEF's supply to 30
days is it maintains sufficient quantities of MedLog personnel for each MEF to
deploy. These personnel provide the link between deployed forces and the remain-
behind MedLog assets. This insures that, once the medical elements establish
operations in the combat theater, they will have the in-country support structure
for rapid resupply of needed supplies and equipment. Additionally, it will insure
enough remain-behind personnel familiar with MedLog operations are available to
reconstitute the AMALs and support deployed MedLog personnel.
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E. COMPLETE RELIANCE ON PRIME VENDOR SUPPORT
1. Eliminating AMAL Reserves
A more radical approach to providing contingency response is to eliminate
the MedLog companies' entire consumable AMAL inventory, relying entirely on
the Prime Vendor and industry to meet wartime demand. Due to their rapid
response capability, maintaining the MPF squadrons would be essential for both
American strategic mobility and its commitment to forward presence. Again,
increasing the minimum MPF shelf-life requirement of 18 months is essential,
otherwise some form of Fly-In Echelon stocks must be maintained. Using all
three MPF squadrons gives a deploying Marine Corps MEF a 30-day supply of
medical supplies after initiating ground action. DPSC could provide supplies for
an additional 120 days of support. This would give 150 days for the Prime
Vendor and industry to respond and provide continuing support. While Prime
Vendor contracts specify a fill rate of 95 percent in 24 hours, it is questionable
whether they could meet the deadline for all immediate deployment requirements.
However, with 150 days of support already on hand there is little need to enforce
the 24 hour contract deadline. Give them 90 days and there is still a 60 day safety
window. Though the expense involved with emergency contracts can be great,
according to GAO's August 1993 report DPSC spent $257 million to meet all
three services' emergency procurement during Operation Desert Shield, three
months provides sufficient time for American and foreign industries to meet
demand for all but the most military-unique items. DPSC could even write surge
requirements into peacetime procurement contracts, thereby giving .the
pharmaceutical and medical/surgical industries financial incentive to maintain this
capability. Unless world crises become routine, the cost savings for this
alternative could well justify the added expense of emergency contracts, provided
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the Marine Corps' cost share would be less than the eight million dollars currently
required each year.
2. Maintaining Military Unique Items
One risk remaining in completely relying on Prime Vendor support is the
relative scarcity of military-unique items. An August 1993 GAO study reported
DPSC encountering problems in procuring military-unique medical supplies,
especially "those with low peacetime demand but high wartime demand, those that
are specific to the theater of operations, and those requiring a different strength
dosage or method of administration than that used in civilian practice." (GAO,
August 1993) The report went on to list four items for which DPSC had the most
difficulty meeting demand throughout the Persian Gulf build up. These four were:
(1) Mark I Nerve Agent Antidote Kit, (2) atropine injector (part of the Mark I Kit
but also used individually), (3) pyridostigmine bromide tablets (pre-treatment for
nerve gas), and (4) immune serum globulin (a vaccine to boost the immune
system. Additionally, a 1988 National Defense University study identified
potential problems in surge capability for the autoinjectors used in the Mark I
Nerve Agent Antidote Kit. The autoinjectors represent perhaps the most military
unique requirement. There is only one manufacturer, no commercial market, and
they are only used during wars involving chemical or biological weapons. Since
industry does not adequate production to support war time requirements for these
items, some form of war reserve must be maintained.
3. Maintaining the MedLog Infrastructure
Eliminating the consumable AMAL reserves from each MEF, though
financially sound, also eliminates the medical logistics personnel training base. If
deploying medical units do not have personnel familiar with replenishing medical
supplies, their level of medical support is effectively limited to the 30 days of
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supply prepositioned on the MPF ships. Especially during the build up phase of
combat operations, it is important to treat the wounded, evacuate those with severe
injuries, and return to the battle as quickly as possible those still capable of
performing their duties. If after these initial stocks are consumed it is impossible
to do this, the military has failed in its mission to the country and to its personnel.
Even with MedLog personnel maintaining each MEF's AMAL equipment blocks
and support routine training exercises, complete reliance on the Prime Vendor
would prove inefficient for maintaining this training base, making this alternative
risky.
F. CONTRACTS WITH COMMERCIAL VENDORS
Where there is profit, there is someone willing to provide a service. The
same could be true for the medical PWR business. Paying the Prime Vendor to
perform the PWR mission is certainly an option open for medical planners. DPSC
could contract with the Prime Vendor to maintain enough consumable items to
meet specified wartime requirements. Additionally, the Prime Vendors would be
responsible for associated redistribution and disposal costs for expiring items.
Making a profit is critical in the private sector, and the Prime Vendor may devise
more efficient methods to meet the Marine Corps' medical logistics requirements.
One advantage Prime Vendors have is the assistance of the entire military and
commercial hospital industry to rotate required medical supplies. Prime Vendors
make their money by accurately forecasting demand and minimizing total inventory
costs. By contracting with Prime Vendors to increase their inventory, the DoD
would be providing financial incentive to the Prime Vendor to maintain additional
stocks. As long as contracts are for an amount less than is currently wasted in
replacement and disposal costs, there remains an advantage to this alternative.
Unfortunately, as mentioned in the last section, the loss of the medical logistics
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training base severely affects war time support making this alternative equally
risky.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The threat of global war once forced the DoD to maintain enough reserves
to sustain all military forces for six months, giving industry time enough to surge
production. We now face limited conflicts where only a necessary fraction of our
force will be employed and we have a robust industry to support it. The Prime
Vendor Program, a new addition to our deployment response, provides an
opportunity to streamline our medical war reserve mission. With the exception of
certain military-unique pharmaceutical and medical/surgical supplies, there is no
need to maintain the current level of AMALs. Minimizing costs, however, is only
one factor in deciding how much reserve to maintain. The ability to wage war
involves more than drawing from critical reserves. It also requires maintaining the
personnel necessary to provide continued medical support. The Marine Corps
must maintain the medical logistics infrastructure to support deployed medical
units. With military treatment facilities reducing the number of personnel assigned
to this mission, the medical logistics companies will become the principal source
of this critical war reserve.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Maintaining prepositioned war reserve AMALs is a costly undertaking.
Due to their dated and deteriorative nature, maintaining these reserves requires
continuous monitoring and replacement of expiring supplies. Their life-saving
function, however, makes maintaining them a serious responsibility. Deciding to
reduce stocks now could result in unnecessary loss of life later. No medical
logistician will knowingly allow survival rates to drop as a result of reduced
materiel support while the potential exists to provide the necessary supplies and
services. Accordingly, senior medical logistics planners are reluctant to reduce
war reserve quantities. With declining defense budgets, decisions are constantly
being made at lower levels to reduce medical reserves, keeping AMALs below
maximum readiness. As discussed in Chapter HI, the end of the Cold War has
greatly reduced the risk of global war. At some point, the Marine Corps must
realize current stock levels are far greater than now required. Each MEF's
medical reserves should not be considered reserved solely for that MEF's potential
requirements. These supplies can be redistributed anywhere in the world to
support a contingency, regardless of the service involved. The Prime Vendor can
reconstitute the reserves before the nation's strategic lift can deploy all the
necessary contingency forces. DPSC continues to maintain 120 days of war
reserves, and are well prepared to use military airlift and the commercial
transportation industry to fulfill their mission of supporting deployed forces.
Given the greatly reduced force requirements, the pharmaceutical and
medical/surgical supply industries are capable of meeting demand for all but the
most military-unique medical requirements during war.
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The AMAL concept is still a viable system for providing deployed and
deploying personnel with a standard medical supply block, and maintaining 30
DOS at each MEF should remain a priority. However, maintaining 60 DOS in a
constant state of readiness for three MEFs is a practice designed during a gloomy
period in our nation's history. Global war was around every corner and the
commercial medical/pharmaceutical and transportation industries were too small
to provide timely surge capability. It is time the Marine Corps stopped relying on
a system designed in the past, and put faith in technological and commercial
advances in both production and transportation.
Chapter II discussed successes achieved by military treatment facilities in
adopting commercial medical resupply practices. The Prime Vendor is the ideal
partner for the military medical logistics system, providing rapid response that
easily adapts to outfitting deploying unit medical requirements. A nation-wide
network and close relationships with manufacturers produce an incredible response
capability. The Prime Vendor has already proven its worth in a contingency by
filling over 90 percent of the AMAL requirements for the USNS Comfort during
Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti. Were the contracts to so specify, Prime
Vendors could meet the requirements for much larger deployments as well.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Adopt the Prime Vendor Program
The Marine Corps should adopt the Prime Vendor Program for all their
medical logistics requirements. Using this as their primary source of supply, with
the Prime Vendor supported bar code scanning devices, software and training, will
provide significant savings. As discussed in Chapter IV, each MEF will save a
minimum of approximately $411 ,000 annually ($350,000 from Prime Vendor plus
$61 ,000 in bar code efficiency). Between the Maritime Prepositioning Force and
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the Norway Air Landed MEB, a savings of $279,000 can be achieved, for a total
savings to the Marine Corps of over $1.5 million annually.
An additional savings can be achieved through obtaining supplies with
longer remaining shelf-lives through the Prime Vendor. DPSC does not always
provide each medical logistics company with their highest remaining shelf-life
items. Every month lost on shelf-life means the MedLog companies have to
replace a perishable item more often. With the Prime Vendor Program, the
MedLog companies would receive the items almost direct from the manufacturer's
assembly line. In the long run, this will reduce replacement, redistribution, and
disposal costs, a potential savings of up to $1.2 million per MEF per year.
If the Marine Corps takes advantage of the "return-for-credit" option
available in the basic Prime Vendor Program, the MedLog companies'
replacement and disposal costs would be virtually nonexistent. Due to the
military-unique nature of many AMAL items, and the financial loss of purchasing
and disposing of large quantities of unused medical waste, this option would
require DPSC to negotiate new contracts with the Prime Vendors. Although
prompt redistribution of widely used commercial items can prevent loss to the
Prime Vendor, there would have to be some type of monetary compensation added
to the current contracts to keep this option open for military-unique items. With
annual costs exceeding eight million dollars for replacing and disposing of expired
shelf-life items, the Marine Corps could apply this much to the contract and still
reduce disposal costs and decrease short shelf-life replacements.
2. Reduce AMAL Requirements
The Marine Corps should reduce the AMAL requirements from a 60 day
capability to 30 days of supply. There is tremendous redundancy in maintaining
60 days of AMAL for three MEFs when the biggest threat the U.S. expects to
support is two major regional conflicts. Using the AMALs from the three MEFs,
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the MPF, NALMEB stocks, and DPSC's medical reserves, there are sufficient
reserves to support expected requirements. Strategic lift limits U.S. response to
a contingency, but this lift can move the AMALs from any prepositioned location
directly to the area of operations. If necessary, the nation's domestic
transportation industry is well suited to meet war reserve redistribution
requirements within the continental U.S. without utilizing strategic lift assets. The
Prime Vendor relies on this same transportation industry to keep both commercial
and MTF customers supplied and to reconstitute a MedLog company's issued
reserves well before 180 days of reserves are expended. Savings to the Marine
Corps, in conjunction with the Prime Vendor initiative mentioned above, equates
to over $4.5 million a year.
a. Meeting Mount-Out Requirements
Maintaining 30 days of supply at each MEF preserves two essential
requirements of deploying forces. First and foremost it ensures forces have their
necessary immunizations and mount-out issue when required to deploy. "All
medical support elements of a MAGTF mount-out with equipment and medical
consumable items sufficient for projected 15 days (minimum) of combat support
operations." (FMFM 4-50) Current MedLog company stocking procedures have
this supply on hand to issue when necessary; the remaining 45 days deploy in bulk
with deploying MedLog personnel during the general unloading phase. Reducing
the requirement to 30 days of supply maintains this "out-the-door" requirement,
reducing the bulk supply from 45 days to 15 days. Each MEF could redistribute
their 15 day bulk supplies to the area of operations, supporting a deployed MEF's
requirements then immediately replenish their stocks from the Prime Vendor. The
MedLog Company would also begin replenishing their reserves, giving the Prime
Vendor at least 45 days from MEF activation before DPSC reserve would have to
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be used. Considering the Prime Vendor contract requires over 95 percent fill rate
in 72 hours, this provides considerable leeway for the Prime Vendor to respond.
b. Maintaining MedLog Training Base
Though requirements are reduced by half, maintaining AMALs in
each MEF provides MedLog personnel trained in managing and handling medical
supplies. As MTFs reduce the number of personnel in their medical logistics
billets, the number of corpsmen familiar with this critical activity diminishes.
Rebuilding this capability in an austere combat zone would require an extensive
retraining period, with commensurate mistakes and delays. The magnitude and
urgency of supporting medical requirements in a combat zone would prohibit such
retraining. Maintaining 30 days of supply in each MedLog company, though
perhaps not necessary to meet actual wartime medical requirements, does provide
human resource capital to ensure the medical supplies flow into the area of
operations and out to the remote medical units.
3. Increase MPF Minimum Shelf-Life Standard
Current MPF guidelines require a minimum 18 months shelf-life remaining
on dated and deteriorative items to be placed on the ships during their 30-month
cycle. This requires the deploying MEF to "fly-in" replacement items if the ship
has been out of Blount Island for over 18 months. The longer the MPF ship has
been out of port, the more items needing replacement. Though considered a
rational requirement under previous practices, it is reasonable to expect longer
minimum shelf-lives through the Prime Vendor Program. The MPF program was
designed to rapidly project combat power into an area using the minimal amount
of airlift. If I MEF were to respond to a contingency in January of 1995, it would
have to replace $600,000 worth of expired stock on its supporting MPF Squadron.
This additional airlift burden taxes an already limited strategic airlift capability
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which could hinder movement of critical personnel and equipment during a critical
phase of the deployment cycle. (Menarchik, 1993)
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Military Unique Items
This thesis identified four military-unique pharmaceutical items, plus the
autoinjectors suited only to chemical warfare concerns, that DPSC had particular
difficultly obtaining during Operation Desert Shield. Given their unique nature,
the Prime Vendor and industry may not be able to rapidly respond for a major
deployment. The Defense Medical Standardization Board (DMSB) has compiled
a list of non-equipment medically significant items ranging from aspirin to zinc
consisting of only dated and deteriorative medical items. This D-Day Significant
Item List aids medical planners to identify and select which items must be
maintained in war reserves for any given contingency response. Changes to this
list require medical experts from the three services to reach a consensus on which
items are truly needed for responding to world crises. A comprehensive review
of this list, using Prime Vendor response rates and industrial preparedness plans,
should be accomplished to determine if the Prime Vendor can support initial
mount-out requirements. Eliminating Prime Vendor supportable items from this
list will greatly reduce the steady financial drain of replacing items that industry
can immediately provide.
2. Eliminate Medical Logistics Companies
Current directives prohibit expending PWR materials for other than combat
support purposes. Equipment and consumable AMALs/ADALs may be used in
conjunction with unit training efforts to enhance familiarization but the units that
will use them do not maintain them. The medical logistics companies are
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structured and tasked to provide a centralized supply facility for Class VII items
and medical equipment repair/maintenance. In peacetime, they maintain all
equipment and consumable AMALs and ADALs, issuing them only for requested
training and contingency purposes. MedLog companies are not a medical/dental
organization of the Fleet Marine Force; they perform their resupply and
maintenance mission under the direction and guidance of the commanding officer
of the supply battalions of the Force Service Support Groups.
Recent military reductions warrant studying the possibility of eliminating the
medical logistics companies altogether. If the units using the AMALs in time of
war have the responsibility of maintaining them during peace, they would have the
opportunity to better familiarize themselves with the contents and operation of the
respective AMALs. Every unit commander likes to know that every item
necessary to support the unit is ready for deployment. They know how many
HMMWVs are working, how much communications gear is operable, and how
many weapons are in prime condition. With the current AMAL system, however,
their medical requirements are not rilled until days before their deployment, giving
them no time to fix discrepancies or augment the mandated quantities. In many
cases their medical personnel, since they order routine requirements through the
standard supply system, are not familiar with what is in each AMAL. This
provides an unnecessary disservice to a unit readying itself for war. Transferring
ownership of AMALs/ADALs to authorized units carries the obligation and
responsibility to maintain them in a combat ready status. Though this would
require redistributing the current balance of funds throughout the MEF,
commanders will know their units have the medical support necessary to support
operations well before they are needed in actual combat. The Medical Battalions,
after transferring the MedLog Companies' medical logistics section to their
Headquarters and Service Company, could fill the combat medical resupply
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function during deployments. Additionally, since these battalions own the majority
of medical equipment during wartime, they would become the centralized repair
site for medical equipment. For units remote from their location, contact teams
could be dispatched for this purpose.
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APPENDIX A. AUTHORIZED MEDICAL/DENTAL ALLOWANCE LIST
Fleet Marine Force AMAL/ADALs are arranged in a modular concept.
The equipment module contains equipment and reusable materiel required to
establish the basic function of the module (e.g., operating room). The supply
module contains consumable materiel designed to support the function in the
treatment of a designated number of casualties or to perform a specific task (e.g.,
operating room supplies). For readiness purposes, an equipment module may be
stored in combination with its corresponding supply module. The materiel listed
in each AMAL/ADAL is the minimum amount to be maintained. (FMFM 4-50)
Each Marine Expeditionary Force are required to maintain sufficient
AMAL/ADAL quantities to provide 60 days of capability. New casualty rates
have been established, estimate to be 8,381 personnel per MEF for a 60 day
period, with a maximum sustained rate of 195 casualties per day. This new
casualty rate should reduce Class VHI war reserve consumable density
requirements by 58 percent over the previous estimates. The following pages
describe and list the AMALs each MEF is required to maintain based on these new
estimates.
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AMAL 618 - Laboratory Equipment: Equipment and reusable material required
to establish a laboratory capable of hematology, microbiology, urinalysis, and
chemistry. Number per MEF: 18.
AMAL 619 - Laboratory Supply: Consumable supplies required to perform
hematology, microbiology, urinalysis, and chemistry testing for 100 patients.
Number per MEF: 101.
AMAL 621 - Blood Bank Equipment: Equipment and reusable material required
to establish a blood bank to support an emergency blood collection capability,
monitored mechanical refreigerated storage for 120 units of whole blood and cross-
matching of blood. Number per MEF: 10.
AMAL 624 - Blood Bank Supply: Consumable supplies required to perform
collection of 48 units of whole blood and to perform 200 dross-matches. Number
per MEF: 103.
AMAL 627 - X-Ray Equipment: Equipment and reusable material required to
establish one x-ray room and processing facility. Number per MEF: 18.
AMAL 649 - Laboratory Supply: Consumable supplies required to provide x-ray
support for 100 patients at 10 films per patient. Number per MEF: 102.
AMAL 629 - Pharmacy Equipment: Equipment and reusable material required
to establish a pharmacy. Number per MEF: 18.
AMAL 630 - Pharmacy Supply: Consumable supplies required to provide
pharmacy support to 1,000 persons for 30 days. Number per MEF: 50.
AMAL 631 - Shock Surgical Team/Triage Equipment: Equipment and reusable
material required to establish a basic shock surgical team or triage to support the
receipt, resuscitation, sorting, and temporary holding of major casualties. Number
per MEF: 12.
AMAL 632 - Shock Surgical Team/Triage Supply: Consumable supplies
required to receive, resuscitate, sort, and temporarily hold 50 casualties with major
wounds. Number per MEF: 150.
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AMAL 633 - Acute Care Ward Equipment: Equipment and reusable material
required to establish a 20 bed unit providing care for patients. Number per MEF:
27.
AMAL 634 - Acute Care Ward Supply: Consumable supplies required to
provide ward support for 100 patient days. Number per MEF: 215.
AMAL 635 - Aid Station Equipment: Equipment and reusable material required
to support one medical officer in an aid station environment. Number per MEF:
82 (One per division, wing, group aid station and engineer battalion aid station
table of organization (T/O) medical officer.)
AMAL 636 - Aid Station Supply: Consumable supplies required to provide aid
station support, initial resuscitative, and stabilizing care for 50 casualties with
major wounds prior to evacuation. Number per MEF: 168.
AMAL 637 - Preventive Medicine Equipment: Equipment and reusable material
required to establish a preventive medicine section providing technical preventive
medicine advice, and inspection of food service operations, waste disposal, water
potability and sources, vector control, and coordination of control measures
required for communicable diseases, and monitoring and assisting in immunization
programs. Number per MEF: 3.
AMAL 638 - Preventive Medicine Supply: Consumable supplies required to
support of the preventive medicine effort of the MEF for 60 days. Number per
MEF: 3.
AMAL 639 - Operating Room Equipment: Equipment and reusable material
required to establish one operating room for performance of major surgical
procedures, administration of general anesthesia, sterilization and maintenance of
sterile material. Number per MEF: 18.
AMAL 640 - Operating Room Supply: Consumable supplies required to provide
operating room support for 25 surgical cases. Number per MEF: 131.
AMAL 699 - Sick Call: Minimum equipment and supplies to augment the unit-
held operating stocks of the sick call section of a unit's aid station. This AMAL
is not considered PWR, and is free of all PWR restrictions. It is authorized for




APPENDIX B. MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE COMPOSITION
The Marine Corps maintains three squadrons in their Maritime
Prepositioning Force. The squadrons, and the MEF they are assigned to support
during contingencies, are listed below.
















All ships were downloaded during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. Ships marked with a double asterisk (**) were selectively downloaded in
Somalia in support of Operation Restore Hope.
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APPENDIX C. PRIME VENDOR SUPPORTED MEDICAL SUPPLIES
As of mid-September of 1994, approximately 22,700 pharmaceutical and
65,800 medical/surgical items were available through the Prime Vendor Program.
All military supplies are assigned a National Stock Number (NSN) and medical
supplies are no exception. The first four digits of the NSN are the Federal Supply
Codes. The Federal Supply Codes supported by the Prime Vendor Program are
listed below.
PHARMACEUTICALS
FSC 6505 Drugs, Biologicals, and Official Reagents
FSC 6508 Medicated Cosmetics and Toiletries
FSC 6550 In Vitro Diagnostic Substances, Reagents, Test Kits,
and Sets
MEDICAL/SURGICAL SUPPLIES
FSC 6510 Surgical Dressing Material
FSC 6515 Medical/Surgical Products and Hand-Held Surgical
Instruments
FSC 6530 Hospital Supplies
FSC 6532 Hospital and Surgical Clothing
FSC 6540 Ophthalmic Supplies
FSC 6630 Chemical Analysis Instruments




AAC Acquisition Advice Code
ADAL Authorized Dental Allowance List
AMAL Authorized Medical Allowance List
APF Afloat Prepositioning Force
BUMED Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, United States Navy
CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DAPA Distribution and Pricing Agreement
DDSIL D-Day Significant Items List
DepMeds Deployable Medical Systems
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DMRD Defense Management Review Decision
DMSB Defense Medical Standardization Board
DoD Department of Defense
DOS Days of Supply
DPSC Defense Personnel Support Center
DRMO Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
EDI Electronic Data Interchange
FIE Fly-In Echelon
FMFM Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMFRP Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication
FSC Federal Stock Code
FSS Federal Supply Schedules
GAO Unites States General Accounting Office
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HMMWV High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
IG Inspector General
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MCO Marine Corps Order
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MedLog Medical Logistics
MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS Maritime Prepositioning Squadron
MRC Major Regional Conflict
MTF Military Treatment Facility
MV Motor Vessel
NALMEB Norway Airlanded MEB
NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet
NSN National Stock Number
O/R Operating Room
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTD Out-The-Door
PWR Prepositioned War Reserve
SASSY Supported Activities Supply System
SMU SASSY Management Unit
SOP Standing Operating Procedures
USAMMCE United States Medical Material Command, Europe
UMMIPS Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System
USNS United States Naval Ship
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